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Pl a i n L a n g u a g e

The Ethics

of Plain Language
A Technical Communicator’s Perspective

By Russell Willerton

I

appreciate the opportunity to write to lawyers about the ethics of plain
language from a technical-communication perspective. I am a professor of
technical communication and, formerly, a full-time technical writer. In this
article, I’ll view the ethics of plain language through the lens of the literature
on ethics in the field of technical communication.
But what is technical communication? As a field of both practice and academic study, technical communication is applied communication designed to
help audiences perform specific tasks or solve specific problems. Technical
documents differ from other forms of writing in their audiences, purposes,
styles, and formats.1 In fact, many legal documents (such as contracts, health
forms, and legal guides) are an important—and distinctive—subset of the technical documents people use every day. While several books and dozens of
articles have been written about ethics in technical communication,2 here I’ll
present some principles that apply most readily and most broadly to plain
language in these technical documents.
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Utility
The first principle is utility, which involves making choices
to bring the most benefits to the most people involved. Utility
focuses our attention on consequences. Early proponents of
utility include Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill in Victorian England. Bentham advocated making choices to bring the
greatest amounts of pleasure and the smallest amounts of pain
or discomfort. He advocated a pleasure-focused or hedonistic
calculus to determine the utility of each action. Many are
likely to agree with author Mike Markel that hedonistic utility
is a flawed theory of value: we value many things that do not
reduce to pleasure, and a hedonistic calculus is unworkable
because most effects are not measurable and they cannot predict the future.3
And yet, we frequently employ utility in cost-benefit analyses and quests for operational efficiency. Inefficient organizations are often less likely to succeed than efficient ones.
Thus, there is value in Mill’s recommendation to seek the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Plain-language
advocates often trumpet this utility by demonstrating that documents written in plain language are easier to use than documents that feature jargon, convoluted paragraphs, and crowded
visual design.
In fact, organizations such as Plain Language Association
InterNational, Clarity International, and the Plain Language Ac
tion and Information Network (keepers of www.plainlanguage.
gov) promote plain language because it provides many benefits to many people. Moreover, the title of Joseph Kimble’s
most recent book reflects the utilitarian benefits of plain language: Writing for Dollars, Writing to Please.4 Utility is an
important perspective on ethics, and it aligns well with legal

Many legal documents (such as
contracts, health forms, and legal
guides) are an important—and
distinctive—subset of the technical
documents people use every day.

ethics, but it is not the only principle. If we think only about
utility, we risk equating ethical decision-making with numbers on a balance sheet.

Kant’s categorical imperative

A second principle is Immanuel Kant’s categorical imperative. Kant, an eighteenth-century German philosopher, has influenced ethics discussions for more than two centuries. In
The Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals,5 Kant describes
his reason-based categorical-imperative approach to ethical
behavior in three formulations. The first formulation is to act
as though the maxim of your action was to become through
your will a universal law of nature. According
to this formulation, our actions should be appropriate and consistent in all settings, univerFAST FACTS
sally. For example, telling the truth in all circumstances is a categorical imperative that
Technical communication is applied communication designed to
(generally) makes sense as a universal law of
help audiences perform specific tasks or solve specific problems.
nature. But in practice, Kantian imperatives
Legal communication is an important, yet distinct, subset of
like telling only the truth become tricky. Yet
this imperative underpins many ethical rules
technical communication.
in law and other professions.
Kant’s second formulation emphasizes each
Plain language provides measurable benefits that support utilitarian
individual’s
rights: act so that you treat humangoals, but it also provides other benefits that are harder to measure yet
ity—yours or someone else’s—always as an
are no less valuable to society as a whole.
end and never as a means. Markel comments
that if we are to treat others as ends and not
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whether audiences have this right at all.12
Kant’s second formulation—to treat humanity as an end but never as a means to an
end—includes a respect for people that carries through Martin Buber’s dialogic ethics
(discussed later).

Care and feminist approaches

means, we must accord them their full dignity and write and
speak truthfully.6 For many, this second formulation resembles the Golden Rule: Do to others as you would have them
do to you.7 But Kant did not simply repeat the Golden Rule;
Kant’s second formulation does not mention any reciprocity.
In a footnote,8 Kant implies that he sees in the Golden Rule
the possibility of quid pro quo behavior, acting a certain way
out of one’s own interest in order to get something.
Kant’s third formulation of the categorical imperative, like
the first, focuses on individuals identifying universally appropriate behavior. In the third formulation, Kant says an individual’s will that stands under laws can be bound to the law
by an interest. But to be a legislator of universal laws, an individual’s will cannot possibly be swayed by any interest.9 In
essence, this third formulation summarizes the first two and
describes a universal realm where people live by “self-created
rules derived from reason.”10 As lawyers, you may relate well
to this—since laws, at least in a democracy, are self-created
laws derived from a reasoned debate.
The technical-communication field provides two complementary ways of understanding Kant’s categorical imperative.
While Paul Dombrowski11 describes Kant’s categorical imperative in terms of obligations, Markel describes it in terms of
rights. Thus, in Kant’s approach, the rights of one person define the obligations of another. Respect for individual rights
resonates well with the plain-language movement because
many believe people have a right to clear information. While
some practitioners believe this right is inherent, others question

In recent decades, feminist approaches to
psychology and ethics have acknowledged
the impacts of human relationships that are
missing from principles like utility and Kant’s
categorical imperative. Scholars have acknowledged that men and women often perceive
moral questions differently. Women tend to
emphasize creating and maintaining relationships, focus on specific details in ethical situations, and de-emphasize abstract principles;
men tend to view the details from a more impersonal, distant stance and more greatly value abstract principles that apply broadly.13 Care has great potential to “redress
the imbalance of foundational ethical approaches, which place
too little value on personal and familial relationships.”14
Nel Noddings15 describes caring as a feminine view of ethics that emphasizes receptivity, relatedness, and responsiveness. These ethical judgments of care arise within particular
relationships (such as the lawyer-client relationship) and need
not be universal like Kantian maxims. Feminist ethics also
examines the morality of specific distributions and exercises
of power.16 In my research with plain-language practitioners
around the world, several practitioners made points about
the social value of plain language that reflect feminist points
of view. For example, several employees at Healthwise, Inc.,
told me that plain language can help address the imbalance
of power between physicians, who are experts, and their
novice patients.17 All in all, a greater respect for interpersonal
relationships when creating technical documents could lead
people toward better, more genuine interactions.

Martin Buber’s dialogic ethics
Over the past two decades, a fourth principle has arisen
based on the dialogic ethics of Martin Buber,18 which focuses
on the ethical relationships between writers and their audiences. Buber was an Austrian-born, Jewish philosopher whose
work appeals to a variety of audiences, secular and religious.
Proponents of the dialogic view of ethics often cite Buber’s
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I and Thou,19 first published in the 1920s. Buber wrote about
dialogic ethics in many of his works, and he sought to apply them in his life. Buber wrote and taught in Germany in
the early twentieth century; he moved to Jerusalem after the
Nazis rose to power. In the latter part of his life, he lived
among the kibbutzim social-collective communities in Israel.
He lived out dialogic ethics in advocating for the presence of
both Arabs and Jews in Israel.
In I and Thou, Buber describes two relationships one can
have with others. In I-It relationships, one person speaks down
to the other in technical dialogue; there is no true relationship between them. In I-You relationships (sometimes translated I-Thou), each stands in relation to the other; the relationship is reciprocal. I and You act on each other, and each reifies
the other. While not every relationship is I-You, and relationships will not always stay in the I-You state, the I-You relationship is ideal.
Buber’s depiction of the narrow ridge frequently appears
in discussions of dialogic ethics. Two parties may separate because of significant differences, whether ideological, religious,
or philosophical. They may separate because of what Buber
called existential mistrust. Think about insurance companies
on one side and their customers on the other; consider agencies who collect taxes on one side and citizens who pay taxes
on the other. I call situations like these BUROC situations: from
a constituent’s point of view, these are bureaucratic, unfamiliar, rights-oriented opportunities to make decisions, which
are of critical importance.20
In BUROC situations, an organization’s constituents often
feel like they must face off against the bureaucracy. Feelings of
separation and distance from decision-makers often coincide
with physical separations between the groups. The narrow
ridge, however, is a place between two sides of an argument
where the parties can meet and speak in genuine dialogue if
they regard each other as Thou and not It. Lawyers and plainlanguage communicators have the opportunity to create a
narrow ridge between an organization and its audience by
using the audience’s language, respecting the audience’s levels
of literacy and understanding, and testing documents with
members of the audience.21

Summary
Effective communication, which plain-language communicators strive to provide, reflects these ethical principles. By
doing so, lawyers and other technical writers can create documents that benefit and empower many. In law, then, writing
in plain language should help increase understanding (and

access to justice) for those facing BUROC situations, who frequently lack power and agency. n
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